

Summary of Interviews

SYNOPSIS OF STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS:

Region 6 (King County) Homeland Security Strategic Plan Strategic Planning Workshop

Introduction

Material presented on the following pages represents a synopsis of interviews with more than 60 stakeholders. Interviews were conducted in January and February 2004 with individuals representing a wide range of perspectives including: public and private sectors; Police, Fire, and hospitals; special purpose districts; tribes; elected and appointed officials; and local, State, and Federal agencies. The list of interviewees and the questions that they were asked can be found in Exhibits 1 and 2. Question topics that were breached included regional and Organizational Situation Assessment, Organizational Needs Assessment, Collaboration, Partnerships, and Inter-jurisdictional Coordination, and Strategic Planning.

Questions, a summary of responses and some directly quoted representative responses are listed below in the order the questions were addressed. Responses have been altered slightly in some cases in order to avoid attribution to the individual respondent.

Regional Situation Assessment

1. What do you consider to be the major risks or threats to Region 6, based on probability, consequence, and emergency, and ranging from terrorism to technological and natural hazards?

Most frequently mentioned risks and threats were natural hazards and “day-to-day” emergencies and accidents. This was particularly true for smaller jurisdictions.

Natural hazards:

- Earthquakes
- Floods
- Landslides
- Winter and wind storms
- Epidemics
- Eruption of Mt. Rainier

Accidents:

- Mass casualty events – regardless of cause
- Pipeline, trucking, rail accidents
- Chemical spills
- Urban fires
- Civil disturbances
- HAZMAT incidents

Terrorism (domestic and international):

- Radioactive dirty bombs
- Contamination of water supply
- Bioterrorism – particularly at airport/ports
- Attacks on food supply
- “Eventually our Region will face suicide bombers such as in Israel.”

Specific infrastructure mentioned:

- Power and water: attacks on transmission systems (extended stretches of line or pipe) were generally of greater concern than attacks on sources or introduction of biological or radiological substances
- Sewers, particularly combined sewers, were seen as a point of entry for flammable substances, particularly given combined sewer systems
- Ports: the Ports of Seattle and Tacoma were seen as entry points for explosive devices or bioterrorism attacks
- Bridges were of particular concern given the Region’s fragmented geography
- Transportation infrastructure in general, particularly I-5 or I-405
- Rail lines and trucking infrastructure, much of which was described as privately held
- Olympic Pipeline
- Dams
- Malls and stadiums: place where people gather in large numbers
- Military facilities
- Cyber attacks on Microsoft or Boeing
- Electronic banking infrastructure
- Internet/communications routing infrastructure
- Air traffic control center
- Institutions with iconic, signature strengths: the Space Needle, the Central Water-front
- The Region’s coastline and nearby border with Canada were noted as vulnerable

Additional comments:

- There was disagreement about how large the terrorist threat was against the Region, and against the City of Seattle.
- Many smaller jurisdictions stated that they would not be a target themselves, but would act to support Seattle or Tacoma if they were attacked.
- Many respondents felt terrorism falls under the all-hazards approach, with some very critical of what they see as too much attention and resources devoted to preparation for terrorism. Most respondents felt that their jurisdiction is less prepared to deal with terrorism, particularly bioterrorism, than natural or accidental disasters.
- Questions were raised about appropriate levels of readiness, particularly for high consequence, low probability risks: what is a reasonable and cost-effective level of readiness given other priorities in a constrained fiscal environment?
- There were suggestions to summarize vulnerability assessments that have been done – King County and Seattle Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (HIVA), water (required by EPA) and others – to create a summarized **regional** threat assessment.

2. What are the Region's greatest strengths and challenges in responding to emergencies? How do you see these key factors changing in the next five years?

Strengths:

- "We have a culture of working together. Strong partnerships and established agreements to collaborate are in place, including the Regional Disaster Plan, mutual aid agreements, Fire (and emerging Police) Mobilization Plans."
- "We're seeing the beginnings of understanding of the importance of regional collaboration, rather than focusing on any one entity."
- Strong personal relationships promoting good communication and coordination
- Experienced and highly qualified emergency responders
- "Very high awareness: we've been working on this for a long time."
- "We are lucky to have a progressive emergency and homeland security management community."
- "The relative frequency of natural disasters and earthquakes means systems and people are practiced and prepared to react."
- The zone system established for Fire and EMS, and used by Regional Disaster Plan
- Special teams, particularly HAZMAT teams and the Urban Search and Rescue team
- Universal application of Incident Command System [though others felt that the lack of understanding and commitment to ICS was a regional weakness]
- King County Office of Emergency Management in general and Eric Holdeman in particular
- Communication

- Established interoperability
- NW WARN
- Strong public/private partnerships, coordination with the private sector [also listed as a challenge]

Challenges:

- Many respondents noted that coordination between Police and Fire is generally a weakness, though it was described as varying widely by jurisdiction. Some described a very strong, collaborative relationship between Police and Fire.
 - “Police Departments do not work as well together as Fire.”
 - “We talk about tactics and interact a lot with the Fire Department, but there’s not a lot of clarity about the role of the Police Department.”
 - “As Fire is dependent on Police for access to critical information, this relationship is key and I rely on a strong personal connection with our Police Chief. It must be particularly difficult for cities that contract to King County for Police services.”
 - “Police and Fire don’t train together, but only work together at incidents.”
 - “It’s often difficult to get Police to Planning Zone meetings. They have a different culture and face very different demands on their time. Fire personnel are used to working as a team, less independently, and have more time available for training and planning as they’re not deployed in the field while on duty.”
- Region 6 has a complex governance structure
 - 39 cities and 120+ special purpose districts
 - “We have both the large City and the rural community mentalities and perspectives.”
 - “Home rule means that local jurisdictions can go directly to the State. This makes the Strategic Planning process much harder given the larger cast of characters, all with equal claims to funds without regard to real likelihood of a threat.”
 - Strained relationship between Seattle and King County
- “Varying levels of preparedness and training among different jurisdictions. We rely on our neighbors, many of whom are failing.”
- A lack of equipment and training for radiological or biological attacks or contamination of water supplies
- Highly vulnerable to cyber attacks
- Protection for rail, trucks, and Ports, much of which is in the private sector
- Maintenance of shelters and training for staff responsible for their upkeep
- “The time required to apply for funds means that well-resourced jurisdictions are

at an advantage: without intervention, the rich will get richer and the poor will get poorer.”

- Fiscal constraints on local government.
 - Decreasing support from other departments with cutbacks
 - “Daily staffing for basic emergency response is a challenge. Sufficient regular funding for staff is difficult to maintain just for regular operations.”
- Inter-agency communications
 - Interoperability
 - Coordination and communication, expectations, roles and responsibilities
 - “Some jurisdictions are out of the loop and don’t get warnings. They therefore aren’t able to take preemptive action that would minimize the disruption – part of the communication and information sharing.”
- “Private sector holds much critical infrastructure: the public sector needs to understand this and act on it.”
- Coordination with the private sector [also listed as a strength]
- Regional transportation system is vulnerable to threats
- Regional Disaster Plan
 - “The Regional Disaster Plan isn’t finished. We haven’t practiced it.”
 - “The Regional Disaster Plan sends a message to elected officials that we are set, we are ready. The Plan was sold to elected officials and now leads to complacency. It’s good on paper, but needs to be further developed and tested.”
- “Communication with State and Federal agencies, particularly around public health: during TOPOFF there was no overarching health authority to make decisions.”
- “It’s a slow process: relationships are 90% of emergency management.”
- “Intelligence – many agencies are having trouble trading information. How do you put information together in a meaningful place?”
- “My concern is from a response role, we aren’t done with the Regional Disaster Plan and haven’t trained to it; it’s our response plan for the Region. If we want to use it in an event, we need to understand it. Some of the key decision makers don’t understand all the details about how we’ll share resources and who does what and how we’ll communicate with each other. There are 115 partners to that Plan and we’re not done. I hope some money comes from grants to exercise the Plan.”
- “Seattle has the greatest risks in their jurisdiction and their resources are subject to the same hazards as their population.”
- “Emergency shelters. Parks is a regional system decimated by budget cuts. Parks has 14 shelter sites but lacks the funding to maintain them. There is no water purification equipment or radio equipment. Parks staff has been cut by 70% and control of some parks has been transferred to cities – but they’re not maintaining the shelters or training to use them.”

- “Jurisdictions are not prepared to operate cooperatively across districts, determining what the needs are and making decisions. All have separate EOCs: we need to regionalize EOC operations. Better communication/coordination between EOCs is a fine short-term goal, but the end solution is actual consolidation of EOCs/PSAPs (Public Safety Answering Points). If you need to open your EOC, the event is by definition larger than just your jurisdiction – it is a regional event.”

Change in next five years:

- Improvements in interoperable communications systems
- “Terrorists’ weapon of choice will change, and we will always be playing catch-up.”
- A potential change in funding patterns:
 - “There could be a change either way with the grant funding coming out of DHS.”
 - “I think there will be a catastrophic natural disaster event in the U.S. or in the world to cause us to reinvest in deterring risk of natural hazards. We’ll put more funds toward investing in mitigation. We’ll shift back.”
- “Regional Fire Authority legislation will hopefully pass allowing a city Fire Department to become a regional fire authority and then have the ability to do a levy lid lift. This would allow Fire Departments to recover some of what was lost due to Eyman Initiatives.”
- “The focus on terrorism is helping to educate all of us to vulnerabilities that have always been there, that we haven’t understood until now. Most importantly, there has been little understanding about the interdependencies of critical infrastructure. First, we need to understand and then broadly educate about the interdependencies.”
- “We’re seeing more emergency managers and security staffing in all forms of government: this is going to change how we respond to events.”

3. What are the key critical assets and infrastructures that should be covered in this Strategic Plan?

Analysis of ranking shown in Appendix C.

For specific infrastructures mentioned, see Question #1.

4. Which private sector organizations/companies do you see as being critical to Region 6's ability to function?

General Categories	Specific Firms or Organizations Mentioned
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refineries, pipelines • Power utilities: Puget Sound Energy, Seattle City Light, Bonneville Power • Communications providers (land/cell phones, Internet) and the Exchange Building • Hospitals • Ports • Key contractors (suppliers of tractors and other equipment needed to respond to emergency) • Rail and trucking firms • Bulk mail centers • Banking industry • Construction companies (needed for cleanup and repair of bridges) • Gas stations (a percentage are required to have backup generators) • Trash/debris removal • Decontamination and clean-up companies • Volunteer organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weyerhaeuser • Motorola • Microsoft • Boeing • Honeywell • Verizon • Qwest • Bank of America, Washington Mutual • UPS • Contingency Planners and Recovery Managers (CPARM) • Cascadia Region Earthquake working group (CREW) • The Red Cross

5. How are Continuity of Government and Services (COG/S) ensured? Do you know of jurisdictions/organizations in the Region that have COG/S plan? Are you aware of any efforts in the Region to exercise these plans?

- Most stakeholders felt this was an area of weakness for the Region (though some jurisdictions may have strong plans in place): "One of the largest shortfalls in the Region is COG/S planning."
- Some stakeholders referenced succession plans in emergency management plans.
- "COGS plans are generally not exercised, or necessarily kept current with changes in administration."
- "The County does not have a COGS plan."
- "There are lots of egos involved – mayors and governors don't want to consider someone else taking their place. Deputies and assistants are appointed, but as an outsider I'm not how involved they are, how in practice they are. There are flow-charts and hierarchies in place, but what is the actual level of readiness?"

6. How is Continuity of Critical Services (e.g., hospital services, EMS, electricity) ensured?

- Most stakeholders stated that continuation of such services is addressed in their emergency response plans.
- Design and construction standards were also referenced as being important. Some jurisdictions stated that older infrastructure was not up to these standards: "We would be in serious trouble if there were a significant earthquake. We need lots of retrofitting in public buildings. New roads and overpasses are up to standards, but all older infrastructures are not. We'd be isolated as bridges would fall into water."
- Plans for alternative power generation or backup water/sewer systems were mentioned, as were mutual aid agreements.
- Comments related to hospitals were mixed, ranging from comments that there is a strong system of hospital control to "hospitals are clueless," with "little ability to communicate either horizontally or vertically."

Organizational Situation Assessment

7. What are the key issues related to emergency preparedness and homeland security for your organization/jurisdiction right now?

Responses varied widely by jurisdiction. Some of the more common responses are listed below:

- "Placing greater focus on terrorist threats: re-allocation of resources away from 'all hazards' toward homeland security."
- Preparing more for bioterrorism in particular, which is considered by many to be an area of weakness
- Threat assessment
- Critical infrastructure protection
- Communications
- Coordination between Police and Fire
- Coordination with neighboring jurisdictions
- Completing or revising Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans
- Training plans that are already in place
- Staffing and financial challenges
- Public education and community preparedness

Sustainable funding was a repeated theme:

- "All of it has to do with funding. If individuals like Tim Eyman continue attacks on public safety, basic EMS and Fire, we won't be able to handle terrorism preparedness. If that initiative passes, I'm looking at a 25% drop (\$3.5 M loss) in 2005. I'd

close HAZMAT, the rescue team and be forced to lay off Fire fighters. I would not even be able to touch Homeland Security (HLS)."

- "Sustained funding, great to have equipment, etc. Unless it can be maintained, sustained and carried forward, it won't mean anything. We have state of the art stuff, but if there's no increase in tax base to support those things or replace them when they are no longer useful, it doesn't matter."

8. At a general level, considering all hazards, how would you describe your current response capabilities?

Most respondents expressed confidence in responding to natural hazards:

- "As far as a city, doing very well with response because what of we've been going through – we've had lots of practice with real events and exercises."
- "We're as ready as we can reasonably be. We could do more, but how ready can you be?"
- "Fairly good if other infrastructure (power, emergency responders, etc.) continues to function."
- "We've gone to a great deal of effort and have plans for just about everything. We exercise them through use of table tops and actual experience. We have mutual aid within the Plan, too. Our Fire Department is well-trained and equipped. We feel very confident."
- "We are far better prepared than we ever were. At a general level, have done pretty well because we've had so many experiences with natural disasters."
- Hospitals and the public health system were generally described to be relatively less well prepared.
- Tribes are generally less ready: "This is really a low priority for us, as we're more focused on opening new health clinics and economic development, as well as providing basic social services such as a food bank. We're really focused on basic infrastructure development."

9. More specifically, how would you assess your organization's current preparedness to respond to the range of possible emergencies (i. e., natural disasters, hazardous materials disasters, intentional illegal acts involving explosives or disabling the Region's infrastructure, bioterrorism events)?

With regard to potential are on remote possibilities. We have to take care of our citizens' needs now. In any case, we're not a likely target, and we're ready to respond if Seattle is hit."

- "We're vulnerable to an event of the largest level and would rely on outside resources."

Other respondents indicated greater confidence due to training and equipment (particularly related to HAZMAT incidents) or preparedness under an all-hazards approach:

- "Terrorism is not a new threat – we've always considered a range of disasters in different categories: nature-caused and man-caused."
- "Our response capabilities lend themselves to any response required of any disaster."
- "It's just an evolution. Natural hazard planning has been going on for years. Some idiosyncrasies could occur with terrorism. Those plans, processes need to be in place and we're getting to them. It's just trying to pull everyone together that's the challenge."
- "We have a good Level "A" HAZMAT Team and could implement a good basic response."
- "Our personnel have good basic awareness training and so wouldn't get themselves into too much trouble. We would rely on the King County HAZMAT Providers to respond."
- "We're good on natural hazards and good on HAZMAT. Regarding intentional acts and bioterrorism, we do know where to get resources and the process to access Federal support."

Public health and utilities/public works were generally described to be less well-prepared.

- "The Public Health system is very vulnerable."
- "For bioterrorism, public health is not prepared. There's lots of work to be done."
- "We're not ready – we need education related to bioterrorism. If there are pathogens in the waste water, can workers continue? If there is radiological contamination, can it be treated at the Plant?"
- "We need training for terrorism and bioterrorism: how to find bombs and what do you do with them if you find them. There are different levels of training, and we certainly don't need the same as Police and Fire. But the ability to recognize devices and what to do if we find them."
- "I feel good about our Police and Fire; but public works is the weakness overall. People don't consider public works a emergency responder, but it is. People need to understand that."

10. What do you see as your agency's/jurisdictions greatest challenges?

Combined with question 7.

11. What internal and external planning have you participated in?

The following internal plans were mentioned most frequently:

- Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans or other response plans

- Emergency procedures plans
- Mitigation plans
- Plans for many smaller jurisdictions do not specifically address terrorism

The following external plans were commonly mentioned:

- Regional Disaster Plan
- Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan

Organizational Needs Assessment

12. Let's talk about needs by category. What are your organization's needs for:

- Critical infrastructure protection
- Emergency personnel
- Communication
- Equipment
- Training
- Plans
- Public education

Please see Appendix C Priority of Critical Infrastructures for a summary of interview results to this question.

13. How would you prioritize these needs given access to a reasonable level of resources?

14. How would you spend an additional 10% increase in your budget?

Collaboration, Partnerships, and Inter-Jurisdictional Coordination

15. Who do you see as your partners in homeland security and disaster preparedness?

Many respondents noted a need for clarification of roles and responsibilities, including linkages with State and Federal agencies, and to jurisdictions outside Region 6:

- "We need clarification of State Office of Emergency Management (OEM) role. The relationship to FEMA is also unclear. We need a map of roles and resources, including State and Federal agencies."
- "TOPOFF was an eye-opener regarding State and Federal responsibilities. The feds were in charge, but no one knew what they were doing."
- "Tacoma responds to our house fires here – we have 'automatic aid' and serve each other on a daily basis. If there's a house fire in the southern part of our territory, you'd see 3 of our engines and 1 Tacoma engine."
- "The Marine Corps wants to work with the Seattle Police. They were so shocked at

9/11 that nobody called them. There's a tremendous gap between Department of Defense (DoD) and local emergency responders. Nobody knows how to work with them. I would like to see more partnerships with DoD."

Several respondents also noted that exercises and incidents served to highlight areas where partnerships were weak, such as incorrect assumptions were held about the role or responsibility of other agencies:

- "We'd like to develop stronger relationships via exercises. We sponsored a couple last Fall in Whatcom/Skagit Counties and participated in an FHA-sponsored event in King County in November. It gets groups who don't usually work together: Seattle Police Department (PD), Seattle Fire Department (FD), Health, Ecology. This is critical."
- "Relationships and roles are worked out through exercises, and should involve the Federal agencies more. There are full-scale exercises every 2 years, functional exercises annually, and two to three tabletops per year."
- "In many cases, we now have a plan, but we need to exercise the Plan we have to create consistent expectations."
- "Everyone struggles with roles. Whether they will be providing service to the community, we need all the exercises or tabletops we can do to get clearer on what their role would be and what the community will be banking on them to provide."

Links within public health were noted as being unclear:

- "The largest issue is around the EPA and Departments of Health: testing and public notification in cases of contamination of the water supply. We have written agreements, but they have never practiced. We have 3 exercises scheduled for the year. I'd like more such exercises to highlight gaps/needs."
- "Personal relationships are seen as key, particularly where formal protocols don't exist."
- "The vast majority of our partnerships are informal. We hesitate to sign a commitment to provide resources outside of the company. Where available, we'll send assistance."

16. Are you engaged in any homeland security or emergency response planning or resource sharing arrangements with Federal, State, local, tribal, or private organizations in Region 6? Outside of Region 6?

Combined with question 15.

17. Which organizations would you ideally partner with to supplement existing partnerships? What needs would they fill?

Frequently noted organizations include:

- Public Health

- Federal and State agencies
- The City of Seattle
- Tribes: "It's not that they don't want to participate, it's just difficult to start. We invite them, but need to make them feel fully welcome at the table."
- Schools

18. How is sensitive information being shared between organizations?

Information channels and personal relationships were frequently referenced as important for receiving sensitive information:

- "Very sensitive information is brought over [to Fire] from the Police Department by hand. We have a good relationship with the Police and I feel we have good access to information when it's relevant to us."
- "More importantly, through my personal relationship with our Police Chief. This really makes me wonder about jurisdictions where there isn't such a strong relationship, or where they contract with the King County Sheriff: how would they get the information they need?"
- "We don't have protocols for sharing sensitive information. It's missing. It's one of the flaps we have with the County."
- "Often State Patrol doesn't get information from Feds, and often information doesn't get distributed through all disciplines. The breakdowns are from Federal to State to local and from law enforcement to non-law enforcement."

Specific information systems and information needs mentioned included:

- RAIN
- NW WARN
- "We need a GIS-based system to display plans and have real-time command/control like on a whiteboard. The Pierce County system is text-based and has had implementation challenges. The program was bought by a private company, which tried and failed to implement it in Snohomish County."
- "The current system (MAPS) resides with KC Sheriff. It's too web-based, with no command/control capability. There's no text messaging, access control and authorization control [controls on who can log in and what they can see]. I'd like to see a system held by the private sector, Public Utility District (PUD), or KC or State OEM. It needs to be regional and overlay all jurisdictions."

Strategic Planning

19. Do you have a strategic plan, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or MOUs that references homeland security preparedness?

Many jurisdictions do not have plans which address terrorism, though some have terrorism annexes to their response plans or CRBRNE that have terrorism references/chapters.

Many jurisdictions stated that terrorism planning falls under their all-hazards approach and existing plans.

20. What would you consider to be ideal outcomes of this current Region 6 strategic planning effort?

Several commenters advocated a regional response, with better communications and clear roles and responsibilities:

- “Include Seattle and King County – recognize our interdependency. Require Seattle to share resources with the Seattle/King County Dept. of Public Health.”
- “Understanding of threat/vulnerability by regional partners and understanding that we need to be prepared as a region, not as individual cities.”
- Regional communication
- “Increased coordination between disciplines.”
- “Open dialogue, building relationships. A real solid plan that we can all embrace to help us in a coordinated fashion to bring resources to the effort that we all need.”
- “I would like to see a bullet in the Strategic Plan that mentions interdependencies of critical infrastructures. There should be exercises and workshops that help us understand the cascading impacts of critical infrastructure disruption. Include private sector critical infrastructure representatives in plans, training, exercises, and create a business continuity operations center for emergency responsibility and recovery.”
- “Command and control and what it means, as well as a commitment to train to it and exercise to reinforce it. Coordination around disciplines must relate to command and control – how everyone fits in and how they all work together.”
- “Identify regional interconnectedness: we need the City of Seattle to remain a part of the Region. Trust disciplines across jurisdictional lines. People of the same discipline have the same training and culture and goals so they get along well. There’s much more trust at the discipline level than at the policy level. Leave policy makers out of it and allow operations people to get on board.”
- “The Strategic Plan needs to mandate that every jurisdiction in King County will practice and utilize the unified command system to recover from a terrorist attack. This should be non-negotiable. We talk about Unified Command Systems (UCS) but people at the operational leadership level (Fire Chiefs) don’t understand or don’t like it because they fear loss of command because by definition UCS is multi-disciplinary. This is the weak link now for the Region.”
- “Think of a plague scenario – it’s not a localized event. We have to think regionally: even the City of Seattle can’t stand on its own – any significant event will involve multiple requests for aid and resources, requiring prioritization and allocation of limited resources.”
- “We should have a discipline focus. Operations staff in each discipline get along well regardless of what jurisdiction they’re from as they have the same training and

culture. Relationships are critical. This would allow us to remove politics from the equation. Elected officials need awareness training, but should not be involved at a detail level. What they create plays well to voters but it is not effective. The fire discipline has the Fire Mobilization Plan (State level) and hospitals have the Mass Casualty Plan and policies and procedures (Harborview is the coordinator)."

- "Money spent on a regional response, not the hardening of targets. There will always be gaps. A regional response plan prepares us for all potential events."
- "Fire Departments are divided into zones. The departments in a zone work well together and collaborate. If we could involve Police Departments in these meetings, this would add value. The challenge for law enforcement is resources. It would require additional resources if Police Departments are to be involved."
- "We need a clear, discernable set of steps for each type of disaster and clear roles and responsibilities."
- "The Plan should lay out roles and responsibilities."

Also discussed was the lack of a targets/vulnerability/needs assessment:

- "Identify what target hazards are, where they are at."
- "Threat/vulnerability assessment should be tied to the financial piece. We need an objective standard for making funding decisions."
- "No one has prioritized the Region's needs. We need to say here's what the emergency responders need; here is what public health needs, etc."
- "Getting agreement on how to do threat and vulnerability assessments. We've gone through an assessment currently – but people come up with different results."
- "What we should worry about, where we should put our money – it would not really matter if the Town of Carnation has A, B, or C – the threat is so minimal. But, if we had a plane go down there, we'd know what capabilities they have and what they don't have. Absent a plan, we would not even know."

Resource allocation methodologies were an important subject of comments:

- "The issue of resource allocation is also very important. We pro-rate everything based on population size. That may not be the best way. From EMAC and Subcommittee on Terrorism perspective, we're going to be facing a challenge in allocating resources. We should develop criteria – and not just use the flat rate for every citizen. We could consider things like changing to allocate based on roles and responsibilities and a risk factor from 1-10. That doesn't mean that Clyde Hill won't get some funding, it will probably be a mutual aid community. You need to make sure that everyone gets something, no matter how you allocate funds. We need another way to consider allocation of resources for the Region."
- "It should provide a profile of where resources should go regionally. First responders have been taken care of: now it's time for hospitals and public health."
- "The ability to fund strategies in a fair and equitable manner. The Strategic Plan can

bring us together or further divide us, depending on how fair and equitable it is perceived to be. Establish criteria for funding response, education, resource needs. This is not a policy decision: decisions need to be made by discipline representatives.”

- “The Strategic Plan should lay out a road map so funding can be allocated across needs in a strategic way.”
- “We need criteria for resource allocation – this is the critical piece.”
- “The Strategic Plan should address the priorities for funding for Region 6 – all the entities that operate within the geographic boundary. Should it be COG, interoperable communications or infrastructure protection? What is critical? We usually define that by thinking about the greatest impact for the majority of people. If this Plan is identifying what stakeholders feel is critical, then it will make sense. If it’s just a strategy plan for King County, then it will have missed the boat. If the attitude comes back – ‘That’s a city responsibility’ then, they will have missed the boat.”

Several comments were provided regarding standards for resource allocation:

- “It will also provide a force for standardization, interoperability.”
- “Professional standards. Each of the three zones has a different level of maturity in emergency management and homeland security. Hopefully, the Strategic Plan will outline this – jurisdictions will support emergency management and homeland security functions rather than leave it to reside in law enforcement or fire. They start getting tunnel vision when that happens. The issue needs to be looked at from all perspectives by one entity.”
- “A description of preparedness standards – what it means to be prepared in this Region. That’s what the Plan should do. Go through the ESFs – here’s what it means to be prepared... We need to define what that preparedness level is because it leads to how we should spend our funds. So we’ll know – preparedness means this to us.”
- “Treat the Region as a region, with standardized equipment and training, and train together.”
- “Establish a minimum ‘standard of care’ (e.g., National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 standards).”

In addition to numerous hopes for specific investments or priorities, other hoped-for outcomes included:

- “We need a legal mandate to force policy makers and cities to comply with the Plan’s recommendations. I recommend the Plan be put in front of City Councils and the King County Council, which oversee policy makers and various disciplines, for their approval. Establish a legal mandate (perhaps tied to funding?) for them to agree to and comply with the Plan.”
- “The Plan can’t stop at the county line, which is just a political border. Planning for defense and response should include a semi-circle around the two ports.”
- “There isn’t a lot of information sharing. Everyone’s got a different database. Could

be a big technological undertaking. In my experience, there is a huge wall between Pierce County and King County. There's not a lot of information sharing but they talk a lot. I don't know what it's like between Snohomish and King Counties."

- "The Plan should offer specifics, and take planning to the next level. For example, it might identify the need for bioterrorism equipment in seven places, and identify 27 locations where you could vaccinate people. It should have timelines and be actionable. Remind people why a plan is important – threats are real, and there are consequences to no action."
- "The Plan must have language that states each jurisdiction is expected to have a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) in place already – this is mandated by State law. The regional Strategic Plan must not take the place of this planning."

21. What would make this Plan most useful to your organization?

Combined in question 20.

22. What role should the KC OEM play in regional plan implementation?

The KC OEM was seen by many as the lead in the Strategic Planning effort:

- "It should be the keeper of the Plan."
- "They should be the lead."
- "The County needs to provide awareness, setting the Plan as what people should be using as guideposts as they make their own plans."
- "It's the role of the office to be the central promoter and champion of this Plan, not necessarily because it has the authority to do so, but because the County is the only entity that covers the Region, and because Eric (not to overly personalize it to Eric, but he is seen as the face of the office) has been a focal point for regionalization."

The KC OEM is generally seen as a convener and coordinator regionally:

- "They should be the glue that brings everyone together to work on the objective and continue to report back."
- "They should stress regional priorities."
- "They should provide interagency coordination, and regional service provision in areas such as Public Health."
- "They conduct emergency coordination, not emergency operations. Their implementation efforts are of an advisory and coordinating nature at the regional level."
- "They shouldn't play a role any more than anyone else. They should be a player at the table. They can continue to play a role in administering grants. They should be a regional coordinating body, such as the EMAC."
- "They are a coordinator and communicator. If they don't do it, it would be up to all the jurisdictions to get themselves together and build a mutual aid plan. They are the only agency in a position to do what they are doing."

- “Their role should be to facilitate and develop partnerships. They should know their role, too. Eric is a pro at it.”
- “King County gets it – other counties don’t. Eric Holdeman gets it – he’s very visionary.”
- “Assisting/facilitating for those not capable of doing it themselves. Can’t force it in entities that can do it themselves.”
- “Their primary role is a service provider and coordinator during an emergency. They are the regional coordinator to reallocate resources during an event. During an event we may run out of stuff – traffic signs or Police officers, for example – and they can help assess needs and reallocate resources as needed.”
- “KC OEM could take a more active role in understanding the nuances. We are a regional partner with everyone. If they understood our challenges and difficulties, they’d have a better understanding of the system.”
- “The County is in search of a regional role in EMS. Instead of trying to define a role – we should sit down and talk about what the need is. The KC OEM could have a role – could have a convening role, could have a management role – but that needs to be agreed upon.”

EXHIBIT I: STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED

Individuals that were interviewed as a group are listed together.

1	Jim Hamilton , Chief Executive Officer	American Red Cross
2	Russ Vandver , Fire Chief	Auburn Fire Department
3	Pete Lewis , Mayor	City of Auburn; Suburban Cities Association
4	Gennie Thompson , Vice President and Regional Manager, Business Continuity Emergency Management	Bank of America
5	Pete Lucarelli , Fire Chief Barb Graff , Emergency Preparedness Manager, Fire Department Bill Bryan , Captain, Police Department Earl Medhal , Facilities Manager, Parks Department Al King , Operations Manager, Utilities Department	City of Bellevue
6	Bob Zimmerman , Manager of Emergency Preparedness	Boeing
7	Gary Long , City Manager	City of Burien
8	Tom Peadon , General Manager	Coal Creek Utility District
9	LCDR Ellyn Metcalf , Asst Chief, Port Operations	Coast Guard Homeland Security Directorate
10	Scott Crabtree , Acting Special Agent in Charge	FBI
11	Al Church , Fire Chief	Federal Way Fire Department
12	Dave Maehren , Fire Commissioner	Northshore Fire Department
13	Chris Martin , Director of Emergency Services	Harborview
14	Bryan Howard , Sergeant	King County Sheriff Office
15	Ed Crawford , Police Chief	Kent Police Department
16	Mike Painter , Captain	Kent Police Department
17	Larry Rabel , Emergency Manager Brian Felczak , Deputy Fire Marshall	City of Kent
18	Kurt Triplett , Chief of Staff	King County
19	Rich Krogh , Chief	King County Sheriff Office

20	Paul Tanaka , Administrative Officer of Executive Office	King County
21	Allen Alston , Safety Specialist, Wastewater Treatment Division Chair of DNRP Emergency Management Committee	King County Department of Natural Resources and Parks, Wastewater Treatment Division
22	Eric Holdeman , Director	King County Office of Emergency Management
23	Shad Burchan , Project Manager	King County Office of Emergency Management
24	Laurel Nelson , Program Coordinator Regional Planning	King County Office of Emergency Management
25	Mike DeCapua , General Manager	Metro Transit
26	Wendy Freitag , Manager, Emergency Preparedness	Microsoft
27	Mark Nunes	Overlake Hospital
28	Matt Morrison , Executive Director	Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER)
29	Ed Reed , Program Manager	Pierce County Department of Emergency Management
30	Rod Hilden , Seaport Security Operations Manager	Port of Seattle
31	John Batiste , Deputy Chief of Police	Port of Seattle
32	Joan Tritchler , Communications Director	Puget Sound Educational Service District
33	Mary Robinson , Manager Customer Relations/ Operations	Puget Sound Energy
34	John Ryan , Fire Chief	Redmond Fire Department
35	Robert Schneider , Emergency Preparedness Manager	Redmond Fire Department; Suburban Cities Association
36	Walt Canter , Commissioner	Cedar River Water and Sewer District
37	Michael Loehr , Emergency Management Manager	Department of Public Health Seattle & King County
38	Brent Wingstrand , Assistant Chief	Seattle Police Department, Emergency Preparedness Bureau

39	Ines Pearce , Program Manager	Seattle Police Emergency Management
40	Robin Friedman , Strategic Advisor II	Seattle Public Utilities
41	Jim Mullen , Director of Emergency Management	City of Seattle
42	Tim Ceis , Deputy Mayor	City of Seattle
43	Gil Kerlikowske , Police Chief	City of Seattle
44	Denise Turner , Police Chief	Shoreline Police Department; King County Police Chiefs Association
45	Roger Serra , Director	Snohomish County Dept of Emergency Management
46	Fuzzy Fletcher , Mayor	City of Snoqualmie
47	Matt Mattson , Tribal Administrator Ray Mullen , Director of Economic Development	Snoqualmie Tribe
48	Jim Morrow , Director, Public Works	City of Tukwila
49	Steve Charvat , Emergency Management Director	University of Washington, Emergency Management Office
50	Nancy Bickford , Homeland Security Strategic Planner	Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division
51	Roger Hieb , Homeland Security Section Manager	Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division
52	Glen Woodbury , Director	Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division
53	Arel Solie , Homeland Security UASI Program Manager Jeff Parsons , Infrastructure/Logistics Program Manager Bob Isaman , Terrorism and HAZMAT Plan Coordinator	Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division
54	Tom Lentz , Assistant Regional Planner for Operations, NW Region	Washington State Department of Transportation
55	Peggi Shapiro , Urban Program Coordinator	Washington State Hospital Association

EXHIBIT II: STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The following is the questionnaire that was sent out to all participants.

Homeland Security Region 6 (geographic King County), encompassing the jurisdictions contained in King County, is developing a Homeland Security Strategic Plan. This Plan will outline approaches to enhancing intra-Region preparedness over the next five years through effective use of existing and new resources, identification of opportunities, and the setting of priorities. As a key regional homeland security stakeholder, your perspective on this process is critical to the Plan's development.

This interview is being conducted by a team headed by ICF Consulting, who is providing contract support composed of experts in homeland security and strategic planning. Your responses will be used by our team to assist in designing the draft of the regional Strategic Plan.

We would like to ask you a series of questions to determine current capabilities, needs, and expectations as they relate to making this an effective and useful Plan.

Regional Situation Assessment

1. What do you consider to be the major risks or threats to Region 6, based on probability, consequence, and emergency, and ranging from terrorism to technological and natural hazards?
2. What are the Region's greatest strengths and challenges in responding to emergencies? How do you see these key factors changing in the next five years?
3. What are the key critical assets and infrastructures that should be covered in this Strategic Plan?

Rank order what you see as the top five priorities from the following list of critical infrastructures (derived from the *National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets*):

- Agriculture and Food
- Banking and Finance
- Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials
- Defense Industrial Base
- Emergency Services
- Energy
- Government Facilities/Agencies
- Information and Telecommunications
- Law Enforcement

- National Monuments and Icons
 - Postal and Shipping
 - Public Health
 - Transportation
 - Water
 - Others (please specify)
4. Which private sector organizations/companies do you see as being critical to Region 6's ability to function?
 5. How are Continuity of Government and Services (COG/S) ensured? Do you know of jurisdictions/organizations in the Region that have COG/S plan? Are you aware of any efforts in the Region to exercise these plans?
 6. How is Continuity of Critical Services (e.g., hospital services, EMS, electricity) ensured?

Organizational Situation Assessment

7. What are the key issues related to emergency preparedness and homeland security for your organization/jurisdiction right now?
8. At a general level, considering all hazards, how would you describe your current response capabilities? *(Interviewer – ask this as a follow-up if there is confusion: For example, how would your organization respond to a major Puget Sound earthquake?)*
9. More specifically, how would you assess your organization's current preparedness to respond to the range of possible emergencies (i.e., natural disasters, hazardous materials disasters, intentional illegal acts involving explosives or disabling the Region's infrastructure, bioterrorism events)? *(Interviewer – ask this as a follow-up if there is confusion: As a specific example, how would a bioterrorism event require a different response from your organization or from others with whom you interact during emergencies?)*
10. What do you see as your agency's/jurisdiction's greatest challenges?
11. What internal and external planning have you participated in?

Organizational Needs Assessment

12. Let's talk about needs by category. What are your organization's needs for:

- Critical infrastructure protection?
- Emergency personnel?
- Communication?
- Equipment?
- Training?
- Plans?
- Public education?

13. How would you prioritize these needs, given access to a reasonable level of resources?

14. How would you spend an additional 10% increase in your budget?

Collaboration, Partnerships, and Inter-jurisdictional Coordination

15. Who do you see as your partners in homeland security and disaster preparedness?

16. Are you engaged in any homeland security or emergency response planning or resource sharing arrangements with Federal, State, local, tribal, or private organizations in Region 6? Outside of Region 6?

- If yes, with which organizations?
- How would you characterize these relationships?
- How could these relationships be strengthened?
- Do you feel there is a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities between your partners and your organization?

17. Which organizations would you ideally partner with to supplement existing partnerships? What needs would they fill?

18. How is sensitive information being shared between organizations?

Strategic Planning

19. Do you have a strategic plan, SOPs, or MOUs that references homeland security preparedness?

- If yes, how is it being implemented?
- Please send us a copy.

20. What would you consider to be ideal outcomes of this current Region 6 strategic planning effort?

- What would most help you actually implement the resulting Region 6 Strategic Plan? (Consider public education and outreach, political support, published best practices, and professional standards)

21. What would make this Plan most useful to your organization?

22. What role should the KC OEM play in regional plan implementation?

Conclusion

23. What other questions do you have, or think need to be answered in this project?

24. Are there other people we should be talking to about these issues?

Written Follow-up Question

Thank you for participating in our oral interview. We request a little more of your time to reflect upon one question on the overall goals and *objectives* of the Strategic Plan. Your thoughts on the goals and objectives of the Strategic Plan will assist in ensuring that your jurisdiction's priorities are integrated in the Plan design and review process. Your answer(s) will guide the development of the regional goals and objectives, and will be referenced in the Plan.

The Department of Homeland Security Office for Domestic Preparedness has published a Statewide Template Initiative. The initiative provides States with guidelines on how to prepare comprehensive and compatible State, local and tribal Homeland Security plans. The Template is consistent with and supports implementation of the "National Strategy for Homeland Security." Copies of the Statewide Template Initiative can be found on the web at:

http://www.shsasresources.com/documents/statewide_template.pdf

One of the key components of the Statewide Template Initiative is the development of *goals* and *objectives*. A goal is the desired level of performance or capability, and an objective is the task or activity that will help achieve the goal. For example:

Goal: Quickly establish communication among various response organizations during an emergency.

Objectives:

Purchase/establish a communications system.

Train personnel on the communications system.

Please provide a written response to the following two questions:

- 1) What are your overall goals for response (e.g., desired level of performance or capability)?
- 2) What specific objectives (e.g., implementing task) will help you achieve your response goals?

Feel free to break out goals and objectives by natural disaster, terrorism, and hazardous materials emergencies.

If you have any questions about the terminology, please call Ramona Burks at (425) 747-6863 or Mike Armstrong at (703) 934-3179. Please return your response to Ramona Burks by e-mail at rburks@icfconsulting.com, or by fax at (425) 653-3026. Thank you.